The paper deals with the di¤usion of GHG mitigation technologies in developing countries. We develop a model where an abatement technology is progressively adopted by …rms and we use it to compare the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) with a standard Cap and Trade scheme (C&T). In the presence of learning spillovers, we show that the CDM yields a higher social welfare than C&T if the …rst adopter receives CDM credits whereas the followers do not.
Introduction
Due to economic growth, developing countries are expected to overtake industrialized countries as the leading source of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the medium or long term. The transfer and di¤usion of climate-friendly technologies in these economies is seen as a key means for solving the climate change problem. Accordingly, technology issues are included in both the United Nations Framework The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is considered by many as an important tool to stimulate technology transfer and di¤usion. It is an arrangement under the Kyoto Protocol allowing industrialized countries with a greenhouse gas reduction commitment (the so-called Annex 1 countries) or …rms located in these countries to invest in emission reducing projects in countries that have not made such commitments (the Annex 2 countries). These projects, usually carried out in developing countries, provide a cheaper alternative to costly emission reductions in industrialized countries. They also assist host countries in achieving sustainable developement. The CDM can …nally contribute to international technology transfer by …nancing projects using technologies not available in the host countries and to technology di¤usion within the countries. 1 Such transfers have gradually gained in importance in policy debates; they are in particular at the core of ongoing talks on the Post-Kyoto regime.
In this paper we develop a model to study whether emissions trading can yield the socially optimal path of technology di¤usion 2 . We focus on the CDM, 1 It is worth noting that the CDM does not have an explicit technology transfer and di¤usion mandate under the Kyoto Protocol. But the CDM is clearly linked to the technological issue in the policy debate on climate change, and in particular, in post-Kyoto talks. 2 The model implicitly relies on a relatively narrow de…nition of technology transfer. In whose speci…city lies in the additionality requirement, which is that …rms may implement a CDM project only if emissions credits make the project profitable. In order to investigate the impact of additionality, we compare the CDM with the traditional Cap and Trade program (C&T) in which any abatement -whether privately pro…table or not -makes emissions credits available. We then characterize two ways to improve the e¢ ciency of the CDM: relaxing the additionality conditions and allowing collective CDMs.
The model describes n …rms located in a host country which initially operate with an old technology. These …rms could adopt a cleaner technology simultaneously or sequentially. The …rst adoption is usually the international technology transfer, since the technology was not previously available in the country. Subsequent adoptions correspond to the di¤usion within the host country.
Adoption entails a …xed cost which endogenously decreases once the technology has been introduced in the host country. In reality, that decrease may occur because observing the outcome of the …rst adoption of the new technology reduces uncertainty about technology bene…ts for subsequent adopters (called "followers"), or the …rst company to adopt -the "leader" -accumulates learning-by-doing skills which di¤use through various channels (e.g. labor market) to potential adopters.
These learning spillovers generate two types of ine¢ ciency. The …rst is the standard under-provision problem. The propensity for a …rm to take the lead in adopting new technology is low, since …rms who may consider the step fail to take into account positive externalities, thereby hindering technology transfer.
The second ine¢ ciency is a coordination problem that results from the dynamic character of the di¤usion process. All …rms would prefer to follow so that they can enjoy a reduced adoption cost. But following requires that one …rm take the lead. This is a dynamic version of a "chicken game" where both …rms derive a particular, it is not designed to analyze issues such as human capacity building.
positive bene…t from adoption but have con ‡icting views on who should go …rst.
One possible outcome is that, although the …rst adoption may be (privately and socially) pro…table, it is delayed.
We show that a standard C&T scheme does not implement the …rst best di¤usion path. One reason is that each adopter receives the same number of credits whatever its adoption rank. The Clean Development Mechanism di¤ers from Cap & Trade program, in that the credit price signal is not uniform across all …rms -it is zero for non-additional projects. Not surprisingly, the welfare impact of the additionality requirement is clearly detrimental when adoption by the leader is not additional, since technology di¤usion is too slow in the absence of credits. However, the CDM unambiguously improves welfare when the leader receives credits while the others do not. This is so because it reduces the followers'advantage, thereby mitigating the coordination problem.
This leads us to suggest two improvements in the design of the CDM: …rst, relaxing the additionality requirement imposed on the leader, by granting credits for the …rst adoption even though it would have been pro…table, and second, The problem of adverse selection has spurred many debates on additionality (see, for instance, Greiner & Michaleowa, 2003) . A severe enforcement of additionality is considered a safeguard to avoid crediting projects that would have been carried out anyway. By taking into account the dynamics of technology di¤usion, our analysis yields an argument that goes in the opposite direction.
Concerns about CDM administration costs have also been the main argument in favor of collective (sectoral) CDM. We stress the fact that they can also organize technology di¤usion when it involves learning externalities.
Apart from the speci…c policy literature on CDM, an important strand of theoretical literature has developed on environmental innovation and policy in- 
Model and social optimum
We use a simple continuous time model that describes the adoption of a GHG mitigation technology by n symmetric …rms under emissions trading.
Firms'payo¤s
At the beginning of the game, …rm i derives a market pro…t per time period.
When the …rm adopts the abatement technology, this pro…t changes. Let denote the pro…t ‡ow after adoption. Adoption also reduces GHG emissions.
Without loss of generality, we assume that …rms emit one unit per period before adoption and zero afterwards. The fact that emission and abatement is normal-ized to unity do not alter any result. Under these assumptions, …rm i 's pro…t function is:
where e i is the …rm's level of emissions 4 . Importantly, adoption can increase the pro…t ( > ) or decrease it ( ). For ease of presentation, we maintain throughout that = 0:
Note that technology adoption by a given …rm does not a¤ect others'pro…ts.
We assume that …rms operate in a perfectly competitive market where a change in the production cost of one …rm has negligible impacts on other …rms We now express the net present private pro…ts. Let T denote the date of the …rst adoption and v L the payo¤ discounted at time T of the …rst adopter ignoring credit sales/purchases. We have:
where r is a discount factor per time period which re ‡ects the cost of waiting (r > 0). Turning next to followers, they derive zero market pro…t ( = 0)
before adoption (between T and T + d). After adoption, they derive the market pro…t . Their net present payo¤ excluding credit sales/purchases at time T is thus:
Emissions trading
Emissions generate a constant marginal damage : At t = 0; there exists a climate regime with an international Cap and Trade scheme to mitigate the environmental damage. The credit market is competitive and the market price is equal to : That is, we assume that the trading scheme is designed to e¢ ciently internalize the environmental externality, but ignores the learning externality problem. The model studies how the n …rms can be included into this existing scheme. We consider two scenarios:
The n …rms are directly integrated in the international Cap and Trade scheme. More speci…cally, each …rm initially receives a quantity of credits corresponding to its pre-adoption emissions 6 . These credits can be sold at price on the market: 7 Hence, the …rm derives a bene…t per time period after adoption.
Each …rm can implement a CDM project whereby it initially receives a number of credits proportional to to its pre-adoption emissions, but only if adoption is not pro…table without credits. In CDM terminology, the abatement project should be additional. 8 Of course, these credits can also been sold at price :
The main di¤erence between the two scenarios is that under C&T all adopters face the same price signal , whereas the CDM yields a price signal to additional projects only. Analyzing this di¤erence is a key goal of the paper.
Timing
We consider a dynamic game in continuous time where the n …rms decide whether and when they adopt the abatement technology. In doing so, they take into account the other …rms'adoption decisions. The game has two stages:
The …rst stage determines the date T of the …rst adoption.
The second stage starts at time T and concerns the n 1 …rms that did not adopt in the …rst stage. More speci…cally the follower indexed as i selects the adoption time T + d i .
Firms act strategically, which substantially in ‡uences the results. Signi…-cantly, this does not mean that the n …rms operate in the same oligopolistic 6 Other initial allocation rules would exactly lead to the same results as outcomes are driven by relative payo¤s and welfare changes. 7 We implicitly assume here that the whole amount of emissions allowances is adjusted to maintain the market price after the inclusion of n additional …rms into the scheme. 8 Under this scenario, the amount of allowances is not adjusted as the additionality requirement preserves the environmental integrity of the international climate regime. product market: In our game, the …rms interact with other …rms that could generate positive spillovers from which they would bene…t. To do so, …rms must be similar from a technological point of view, but they are at the same time necessarily competitors. That they operate on the same labor market, for instance, is much more relevant, as one spillover channel is labor mobility. In fact, what we assume is that the space containing the spillovers is su¢ ciently small for inducing strategic decisions by the potential adopters.
The socially optimal path of adoption
We now derive what should be the welfare-maximizing adoption path. The welfare function is the sum of the discounted …rms'pro…ts and environmental bene…ts. Therefore we need to …nd T and d 2 ; ::; d n which maximize
where …rm 1 is arbitrarily the …rst …rm that adopts at time T while the n 1 others follow with a delay d i :
Our social welfare function is highly restrictive. We ignore the impact of new technologies on consumer surpluses through the product market. We also ignore the impact of di¤usion on the incentives to innovate. In fact, our welfare analysis is entirely focused on di¤usion.
When considering (3), it is obvious that the optimal date of …rst adoption, T ; is either 0; if the term in brackets is positive, or 1, otherwise (di¤usion should not occur). In the case it is positive, the optimal delays are all the same as followers are symmetric:
for any i 6 = 1 and j 6 = 1 . Accordingly, d is the solution of:
Substituting (2) and solving for d yields:
Equation (5) 
which simpli…es as
We gather these …ndings in a …rst lemma:
The socially optimal di¤ usion path is the following: We will maintain throughout the rest of the paper that
This means that we exclude the case where there are no learning externalities in the social optimum as all …rms adopt simultaneously at T = 0. This allows us to focus on the role of learning in the di¤usion of technologies.
Di¤usion under the Cap and Trade scheme
We now start the analysis of the impact of emissions trading. In this section we study …rst the simplest scheme, a C&T one that yields the same price signal to all adopters. More speci…cally, we explore whether this policy approach implements the social optimum. Given the existence of a positive externality, the answer is expectedly negative as the early adopters neglect learning bene…ts. However,
we will see that the positive externality induces two types of ine¢ ciency in our dynamic setting: the traditional under-provision problem and a coordination problem that leads to socially detrimental delays in adoption.
The second stage
Reasoning backwards, we consider …rst how followers react once one …rm has adopted the technology. Under C&T, the followers derive the bene…t per time period after adoption by selling credits when emissions fall to zero and the initial allocation of credits amounts to pre-adoption emissions. Hence, the welfare maximization program (4) and the followers'pro…t maximization program are identical. The equilibrium delay is thus d . This is not surprising. As followers' decisions entail zero learning externality, the decentralized outcome is socially optimal.
The …rst stage
Moving backward, we consider next the …rst adoption. We randomize the adoption decision at each time period [t; t + dt) in order to obtain equilibria in mixed strategies. As we will see, this setup allows us to determine endogenous delays of adoption.
Let x i dt denote the probability that …rm i = 1; ::; n adopts the technology between t and t + dt, provided that the technology has not been adopted yet at time t. Using these notations, a pure strategy consists of a probability which is either x i dt = 1 or x i dt = 0. That is, …rm i adopts (or does not) in the short
Firm i's expected payo¤ at any time t is given by the following Bellman equation:
In this expression, the …rst term v L + =r x i dt is the payo¤ of …rm i if it adopts the technology times the probability of adoption x i dt: The second term
is the expected payo¤ if …rm i does not adopt in the time interval, which occurs with a probability (1 x i dt), and if at least one …rm k 6 = i adopts in the same period, which occurs with a probability 1
is the payo¤ when nobody adopts between t and t + dt. In this case, …rm i derives V i in the next period which is discounted.
In the Appendix we solve the game for equilibria in pure and mixed strategies. This leads to a …rst proposition.
Proposition 1 Depending on payo¤ s, we observe di¤ erent equilibria:
(a) n equilibria in pure strategies, whereby one …rm adopts at T = 0 and the others follow at T + d .
(b) one symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which each …rm i = 1; ::; n adopts with a probabilitŷ
so that the expected delay until the …rst adoption is:
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition is the …rst key result of the paper. The intuition underlying Case 1 is obvious. No …rm ever adopts because adopting …rst is not pro…table (v L + =r < 0): This is so either because the adoption cost c is high or because the gross adoption bene…t + r is too low. The most interesting possibility is Case 2, where we have multiple equilibria.
In this case, the adoption cost is su¢ ciently low for making adoptions pro…table.
But followers prefer delaying adoption so as to derive learning bene…ts.
In this situation, we have v L + =r < v F (d ) + e rd =r, meaning that the incentive to preempt is weaker than the incentive to follow. This is the dynamic version of the "chicken game," where all …rms are willing to adopt but have con ‡icting views on who should go …rst. As is usual in chicken games, a coordination problem results, leading to multiple Nash equilibria.
The economic interpretation of the equilibria in pure strategies, as shown in 2a, is problematic because all …rms have an incentive to acquire the free bene…ts attendant on another …rm's decision to adopt …rst, so that no single …rm wishes to adopt …rst. In that case, we can reasonably expect strategic delays in the …rst adoption. This corresponds to the symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies, shown in 2b, where the expected date of the …rst adoption E (T ) is strictly positive. Given (9), the larger the gap between the leader's total payo¤ v L + =r and the followers'total payo¤ v F (d )+ e rd =r; the longer the delay before the …rst adoption. In the rest of the paper, we remain focused on this equilibrium.
Welfare properties
We are now able to investigate the welfare properties of the C&T regime. To begin with, we recall that the followers'decision is optimal as it does not generate any externalities of adoption. With regard to the leader in adoption of technology, Proposition 2 tells us that the …rst adoption will take place i¤
Not surprisingly, the comparison of (10) with the optimality condition (7) shows that the credit price is not su¢ ciently high to induce socially optimal decisions by the leader as 1. This is the standard result -that positive externalities lead to too few adoptions.
A second ine¢ ciency, interestingly, exists. Proposition 2 predicts an equilibrium in mixed strategies which involves a delay in the …rst adoption even while the optimal date is b T = 0:
We summarize these …ndings in our second Proposition.
Proposition 2 A C&T scheme does not implement the …rst best outcome when In summary, the social ine¢ ciency exclusively concerns the leader: Di¤usion starts either too late or reaches an impass. By contrast, the followers make e¢ cient decisions.
Di¤usion path under the CDM

Additionality
Contrary to a C&T system, the bene…t of the CDM is conditional to an additionality requirement. Since the additionality requirement means that a …rm that adopts a new technology get credits only if technology adoption is not prof- 
The …rst adoption is not additional ( =r c)
This case is extremely simple. When the initial adoption is pro…table without credits, the same is obviously true for subsequent ones. This means that all …rms face the same price signal as under C&T, except that the price is zero:
Accordingly, we just need to substitute by 0 in Proposition 1 to derive the equilibrium di¤usion paths. The fact that =r c rules out the …rst case in the proposition so that we end up with:
Lemma 3 If adoption cannot be additional (c =r), each …rm adopts with
Once a …rm has adopted, the others follow after the delay d 1 ln c (r + ) :
The …rst adoption is additional ( =r < c)
Reasoning backwards, we identify …rst the equilibrium delay e d, assuming that a …rm has taken the lead, which requires c < ( + )=r: Under CDM, followers have two options. They either decide to get CDM credits by choosing a delay e d < d max , or they prefer to give up the credits by choosing a longer delay which reduces the adoption cost. We consider these two strategies in turn.
In the …rst case, we know from (5) 
The second strategy is that the …rm decides not to implement a CDM project.
Lemma 2 says that this leads to a delay e d = d . This strategy is clearly less pro…table than the …rst one when (11) is met: As the additionality constraint is not binding, the …rms always prefer a CDM project, since they can select the optimal delay d and get credits. Things are more ambiguous when the condition is not met (e.g., if r ). In fact, the followers will make their decision by comparing their payo¤ with credits, v F (d max ) + r e rd max , and without, v F (d ).
Appropriate substitutions yield that they prefer the CDM if r < r + r r+ This is very intuitive: Followers opt for the CDM when the credit price is high and/or post-adoption market pro…t is low.
We summarize the whole analysis in the following:
Lemma 4 In the case where the …rst adoption is additional (c > =r), and assuming that a leader has adopted the technology, which requires c < ( + )=r, the followers select the delayd > 0 given by:
As compared to the socially optimal delay d ; additionality can either induce too slow or too fast di¤usion depending on the size of =r: This suggests a complex welfare e¤ect of additionality. We return to this point later.
We complete the analysis with stage 1. We already know that no …rm ever adopts if c ( + )=r: When c < ( + )=r); the coordination problem arises.
Exploiting similarities with Proposition 1 and the results of Lemma 4, we easily obtain:
Proposition 3 In the case where adoptions can be additional (c > =r); no …rm ever adopts if c > ( + )=r): Otherwise, each …rm adopts with the per-
whered is de…ned in Lemma 3 and
(followers do not get credits)
Welfare comparison
We are now able to compare the welfare properties of C&T and CDM. To begin with, social welfare is obviously zero if no …rm ever adopts the technology. This occurs with C&T and CDM under the same condition where c + r , implying that both schemes are welfare equivalent in this case.
When di¤usion occurs under both schemes (c < + r ), we have seen that a …rst …rm adopts the technology with a probability xdt per time period. The social welfare function in equilibrium can thus be written as
where xdt is the equilibrium values of the per-time period probability of adoption and d, the equilibrium delay after the …rst adoption. This expression simpli…es as follows
We will use this expression to compute the equilibrium welfare in the di¤erent cases.
Cap & Trade
By substituting x and d in (12), we obtain a very simple expression:
Since v L + r < v F (d) + r e rd , this is obviously less than the …rst best level which would be
In fact, welfare under C&T would be the same if all …rms were to adopt immediately and simultaneously. Therefore the bene…t of the delay between …rst and second adoption, which amounts to the di¤erence between v F (d ) + r e rd and v L + =r, is entirely dissipated by the delay before the …rst adoption. In other words, the learning bene…ts and the coordination cost cancel each other out.
The intuition is that the higher the learning bene…t, the lower the incentives to take the lead, and thus the longer the delay before the …rst adoption.
CDM
Depending on the value of parameters, there are three feasible scenarios: 1)
none of the …rms receive credits; 2) the leader receives credits, but followers do not; or 3) all …rms receives credits. The …rst path is described by Lemma 2, the two last paths by Proposition 3. We consider these cases in turn.
Case 1: None of the …rms receive credits ( =r c)
We substitutex andd from Lemma 3 in (12) leading to
A straightforward calculation then shows that this welfare level is lower than (13). This is not surprising. The main reason is that followers having zero credits wait too long to adopt, while their response is optimal under C&T (d = d ):
In addition to this, the second source of ine¢ ciency -the delay before the …rst adoption -is not signi…cantly a¤ected by the absence of credits, as this loss relative to C&T concerns both leaders and followers. 
The latter result is counter-intuitive, as followers adopt too early (d
to meet the additionality requirement under the CDM. This, however, does not reduce welfare. We can understand why by looking at (13) . This equation says that the (optimal) learning bene…t is entirely dissipated by the losses due to the initial delay under C&T. The same mechanism works when the followers do not wait for the optimal amount of time under the CDM. This distortion is compensated by a lower initial delay. In this last case, the leader and the followers respectively derive a private bene…t v L + =r and v F (d ). Substituting these payo¤s inx and thenx and d in (12) leads to
a social welfare results that is obviously higher than under the C&T scheme.
This is a key result of the paper. As in the previous case, the followers distort their decision as they have no credits, but the leader now gets credits implying that the gap between payo¤s is reduced. Hence di¤usion starts earlier. We show here that the latter e¤ect outweighs the former.
This result is quite counter-intuitive. Recall that the original problem is the existence of positive learning externalities generated by the …rst adopter whereas followers make e¢ cient decisions if they face the appropriate price signal : The standard policy solution is thus to subsidize the leader. This is not at all what we do here: The leader derives the same bene…t as under C&T, but the CDM deprives the followers of any carbon subsidy. We have shown that this solution partly mitigates the externality problem.
The Proposition summarizes the …ndings:
Proposition 4 There are two cases where CDM & C&T are not welfare equivalent:
1. When adoption by the leader is not additional under CDM, so that no …rms receive any credits, C&T dominates CDM .
2. The opposite is true when the …rst adoption is additional and subsequent ones are not, that is, when CDM credits are only granted to the …rst adopter.
Improving CDM design
We complete the analysis by exploring options which could increase the ability of the CDM to tackle learning externalities. We consider two options: 1) relaxing the additionality constraint for projects generating learning externalities and 2)
bundling individual projects in a single CDM project.
Relaxing the additionality requirement
In Proposition 4 the CDM outperforms a C&T scheme in the case where adopting …rst is additional whereas following is not. The superiority of the CDM is due to the fact that adoption incentives are di¤erentiated. This suggests that, even if not additional, granting CDM credits to the leading …rm could be an interesting option. In this subsection, we explore whether suppressing the additionality requirement for leading …rms would improve welfare compared to the current CDM rule.
Answering the question is not straightforward. On the one hand, this speeds up di¤usion by reducing the delay before the …rst adoption as taking the lead becomes more pro…table. On the other hand, this damages the environmental integrity of the whole scheme by increasing GHG emissions. The reason is that the leader sells its credits to …rms which would have abated emissions otherwise.
Let us now compare the two scenarios.
We analyze here the case where the leader's adoption is not additional, meaning that c =r: Under the standard CDM, the di¤usion outcome is described in Lemma 1 and the corresponding welfare at equilibrium is given by (14) . To characterize di¤usion under the new rule, we just adapt Lemma 1 by adding credit sales to the leader's payo¤ to obtain its per-time period probability of
Unsurprisingly, this probability is higher thanxdt given in Lemma 2 9 . Then, social welfare function is given by:
This functional form is very similar to (12) . The only di¤erence is that we omit the term =r in the left-hand term in brackets as adoption by the leader no longer avoids the environmental damage per-time period. Substituting (16) and d in this expression yields a revised level of welfare in equilibrium:
In appendix we compare the di¤erence between W 0 CDM and W CDM (described by 14) and we establish the following:
Proposition 5 A modi…ed CDM which removes the additionality requirement for the leader's project improves welfare when the number of …rms, n; and the learning parameter, , are su¢ ciently high and/or when marginal environmental damage is su¢ ciently low.
This proposition is very intuitive. When the learning externality is high because there are many followers (n is large) or because adoption cost decreases quickly after the …rst adoption ( is high), relaxing additionality improves welfare because it triggers the learning process earlier. When the environmental damage-as re ‡ected by the parameter -is large, relaxing additionality is more costly as it increases emissions substantially as compared to the current CDM rule.
As the drawback of the revised rule is the hot air generated by non additional projects that are registered under the CDM, we have an interesting corollary.
Corollary 1 Relaxing additionality always improves social welfare if the number of permits allocated in the international Cap and Trade scheme is reduced ex ante by a quantity equal to the quantity of hot air generated by non additional CDM projects.
A sectoral mechanism
A mechanism grouping individual adoptions into a single CDM project is another option for improving the e¢ ciency of the CDM. In post-Kyoto talks, intense discussions revolve around the potential for so-called sectoral mechanisms to gather into a single project the …rms of a given sector or of a speci…c geographical area (Baron & Ellis, 2006 ). This solution is primarily viewed as way of reducing project administrative costs 10 . The Coase theorem suggests that grouping …rms together might also be a possible way to internalize learning externalities and to coordinate adoptions.
The collective nature of the project does not change the way additionality is de…ned: Carbon credits would be generated after each individual adoption provided this adoption is not pro…table in itself, as in the current CDM scheme. Type 2: Mechanisms which could include additional and non-additional subprojects. But, of course, the non-additional projects would not generate any credits. This allows using a sectoral mechanism in Cases 2 and 3.
We now show that both schemes improve welfare but the latter type is socially preferable.
Proposition 6 When all individual adoptions are additional; both sectoral mech-1 0 Already at its 21st meeting in 2005, the UNFCCC Board already agreed on general principles for bundling CDM projects. A bundle brings together several small-scale CDM activities to form a single CDM project. 1 1 In practice, assessing the additionality of each individual sub-projects could be less strict than in the current scheme simply because additionality would be assessed globally.
anisms implements the …rst best social optimum. That is, a leader adopts at T = 0 and the others at T + d :
When only the leader's adoption is additional, a sectoral mechanism of type 2 is the only feasible option. The mechanism does not implement the …rst best outcome but it improves welfare. The leader adopts at T = 0 and the others at
Proof. Straightforward. As all adopters participate, they select the di¤usion path which maximizes the sum of pro…ts and credit sales. In the case where all projects generate credits, the objective function coincides with the social welfare function (3): In the case where only the leader gets credits, the objective function is
which is maximized when T = 0 and
The intuition is straightforward: The …rms can make a binding agreement in which they decide who is adopting …rst and the compensations the leader receives from the followers. A sectoral CDM project is an appropriate contractual framework to do so. In particular, the fact that the credits are jointly awarded makes utility transfers easy between …rms 12 .
Although such an agreement is bene…cial to all parties, an exogenous rule requiring the participation of all adopters is necessary because full participation is not a Nash equilibrium: each follower has an incentive to deviate unilaterally as it would continue to bene…t from the learning externality without the need to compensate the …rm which takes the lead. However, the worst-case scenario all …rms engaged in free riding is simply the scenario of the standard CDM. In other terms, the sectoral mechanism cannot do worse than the standard CDM even in a setting allowing for non-cooperative behaviours.
The proposition also hinges on the assumption that there are no bargaining costs. In practice, sectoral projects may generate substantive transaction costs. But the standard CDM also entails …xed transaction costs, though, which sectoral solutions mitigate.
Conclusion
Project mechanisms such as the CDM are often depicted as powerful levers for the di¤usion of environmental technologies in developing countries. In this paper, we explore this insight by developing a simple model that captures both the transfer of a technology into a developing country and its horizontal di¤usion within the country.
As compared to other emissions trading schemes, the originality of the CDM lies in its additionality requirement, whereby credits are only granted to projects that would not be pro…table otherwise. As a result, the CDM only yields a positive price signal to additional projects. By contrast, the price is uniform across all …rms under other trading schemes (e.g., Cap and Trade, Baseline and Credit).
In order to investigate the role of additionality, we have compared a standard C&T system with the CDM. In the presence of learning spillovers we have shown that C&T schemes fail to implement the optimal di¤usion path because the leading …rm -which generates positive externalities -and the followers receive the same amount of credits. This leads to two ine¢ ciencies: the standard underprovision problem and a coordination problem driven by the fact that adopting …rst is less pro…table than following.
By design, the CDM either yields the same quantity of credits as C&T or, when the project is not additional, zero credits. Hence the CDM cannot reward the leader in order to internalize learning bene…ts as recommended in textbooks.
But it can "punish" the followers. We show that this "punishment" may actually improve welfare. In fact, the CDM yields a higher welfare than C&T in the case where the leader receives credits and the followers do not. This does not solve the under-provision problem, but it does mitigate coordination costs.
This analysis suggests two improvements for CDM design: a relaxed additionality rule and collective CDM projects that gather all adopters. We show that removing the additionality requirement for the …rst adoption leads the CDM to outperform a C&T scheme for all parameters.
We also show that allowing the formation of collective CDM projects is an e¤ective way to suppress strategic delays before the …rst adoption, thereby improving the overall e¢ ciency of technology di¤usion. This is a new argument in favour of collective (sectoral) CDM projects, whose potential is intensively debated in the policy arena. One of the key arguments is that they would reduce administrative burden. Our research shows that collective projects are not only more e¢ cient socially for the implementation of new technologies and di¤usion of those technologies, but such projects are also attractive for …rms; if given the choice, …rms would always opt for collective projects.
In post-Kyoto talks, discussion continues around the question of whether emitters located in such emerging economies as China, India, or Brazil should be covered by a Clean Development Mechanism-like scheme featuring additionality or by a Cap and Trade scheme. Our analysis stresses one advantage of the CDM over other emission trading schemes: The additionality requirement can be tailored to increase the speed of technology di¤usion.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
The …rm i's expected payo¤ at any time t is given by (8) . Using this equation
we derive successively the conditions for the di¤erent equilibria to arise. If the other (n 1) …rms do not adopt, the expected payo¤ of …rm i writes
(1
Since we consider in…nitesimal values of dt, we can eliminate all terms in (dt) n ; n > 1. Noting moreover that 1 e rdt rdt and e rdt ! 1, the expression can write:
This expression is decreasing in x i if v L + =r < 0. Hence the equilibrium where no …rm adopts exists when v L + =r < 0.
One …rm j adopts immediately (x j dt = 1).
In that case the expected payo¤ of the other …rms i 6 = j write:
Recall that v L + =r < v F (d) + e rd =r asd = d > 0 by assumption. Hence the best reply for …rm i 6 = j is clearly x i dt = 0. Knowing this we have to check whether …rm j will still play x j dt = 1. From 18 we know that …rm j's payo¤ is V j = x j v L + =r= (r + x j ) and that …rm j will play x j dt = 1 only if v L > 0. It follows that there are n equilibrium in which one …rm adopts immediately (x j dt = 1) while the others do no adopt (x i dt = 0, i 6 = j) if v F (d) + e rd =r > v L + =r > 0.
Case 3: all …rms play mixed strategies
Consider again the expected payo¤ of …rm i in (8). Since we consider in…nites-imal values of dt, we can eliminate all terms in (dt) n ; n > 1. Noting moreover that 1 e rdt rdt, the expression rewrites:
If v L + =r 0, the expected pro…t V i admits a maximum in x i . The FOC of …rm i's program rewrites into the following equation:
It is clear from 19 that only one equilibrium is possible, wherex i =x for all i = 1; :::; n. The equilibrium adoption strategy is then:
The strategyx followed by each …rm de…nes a Poisson process of parameter nx for the …rst adoption. This allows us to calculate the expected delay until the …rst adoption:
Proof of Proposition 5
We …rst compute the di¤erence:
where we omit d for notational simplicity. The denominator is positive as we are in the case where v L and v F are positive. We can thus focus the analysis of the sign of the numerator
It is then obvious that @X=@n = 2(n 1) v F 2 + ( =r) e rd v F > 0: Note also that X > 0 when n is su¢ ciently high. When n = 2; we have we rely on simulations to show that X increases with and decreases with :
